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1 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Tanguy Le Pesant, L’esprit de défense de Taiwan face à la
Chine, la jeunesse taïwanaise face à la tentation de la Chine (Taiwan’s will to fight as
China looms large, Taiwanese youth and the mainland’s pull), Paris, L’Harmattan,
2009, 256 pp., bibliography.
2 This  book is  interesting on three  counts:  it  throws the spotlight  on a  new
generation of Taiwanese (in their 20s and 30s); it shows the gradual enrichment and
refinement of identity representations in a “post-modern” society, which Taiwan has
come to be in so many ways; and finally, by raising the notion of the “will to fight,” it
offers a perspective that is original and well suited to a comparative undertaking.
3 After an introductory chapter on political changes in Taiwan between 2000 and
2008 and their cross-Strait and international implications, the first part is based on a
detailed survey in 2005 of 564 students aged between 20 and 25 in a dozen Taiwanese
universities.  This  survey  was  complemented by  some 50  individual  interviews with
people aged 26 to 40, fresh interviews from 2006 to 2008 with people from the first age
group, and finally interviews with Taiwanese business people implanted in China. Most
statistics reported in the book relate to the initial 2005 survey. The multiplicity and
relative heterogeneity of sources as well as the political changes between 2005 and the
publication date lead the authors to be prudent and doubly circumspect in interpreting
the data. While the passage of time renders some results obsolete, some broad trends
do emerge, as diverse sources confirm.
4 In the eyes of young Taiwanese, China is above all an ever-expanding source of
economic  opportunity,  a  perception  that  only  reinforces  pessimism  regarding  the
island’s internal market. Actually, most young Taiwanese have never been to China,
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and they’re poorly informed (for their China news, they rely on television more than on
the Internet.)  Temporary migration to  the mainland often leads to  disillusionment.
Long-term migration, when undertaken, is typically towards the United States, Europe,
or  Japan.  The  perspectives  opened  by  the  survey  are  most  revealing  in  respect  of
politics. In sum: the Taiwanese identity is most pronounced in the youngest generation,
but  this  identity  is  becoming increasingly  open-ended and flexible.  Nearly  half  the
respondents define themselves as “Taiwanese,” more than 40 percent profess a double
identity, and only a little more than 3 percent say they are “Chinese.” At the same time,
they  are  open-minded on  future  policies,  not  rejecting  a  possible  cross-strait
unification (if and only if it proves beneficial to Taiwan): 75 percent of respondents
would favour independence if peace would prevail, but 46 percent would accept some
sort  of  unification  (just  32  percent  of  respondents  unreservedly  reject  unification).
Other responses confirm the great flexibility of options. Deep down, young Taiwanese
nurse a fond wish to live in a “normal” country, the authors say. Taiwan is seen less in
traditional  identity  terms  than  as  a  “community  of  fate”  whose  inhabitants,
irrespective of their origins, must be able to decide together (p. 65-66). It is interesting
that  study  abroad  usually  strengthens  the  feeling  of  identity  by  making  Taiwan’s
diplomatic isolation more intensely felt.  A new “attachment to the flag” is  aroused
while abroad, the authors note (pp. 67-70). While on the island, however, the youngest
adult generation is already a “post-reform” one, not much politicised, with a strong
aspiration to “live their own life,” rather fatalistic as regards world affairs (p. 85), and
keenly pragmatic as to future policy options. But it is also a generation ready to rally to
well-identified causes or to be mobilised if its interests seem threatened.
5 While China is seen as a place of economic opportunity, it also looms large as a
political threat to Taiwan (p. 93). But then this perception is ambivalently expressed
because it is sometimes accompanied by a sort of fascination for China’s new-found
might.  This  perception,  too,  is  highly  abstract:  when  it  comes  to  the  question  of
whether China will attack Taiwan, there is an almost even three-way split among those
who think it plausible, those who believe it is not, and those who refuse to answer (p.
101). If a conflict did break out, however, pessimism as to its results is overwhelming.
At the same time, young Taiwanese still believe the United States would intervene in
case  of  conflict,  especially  if  it  is  not  provoked  by  a  unilateral  declaration  of
independence (p. 117). No surprise, therefore, that a majority prefers a peaceful and
negotiated settlement of disputes. The authors point out a paradox: “the will to fight,”
as traditionally understood, is weak and declining further; at the same time, Taiwanese
identity is being constantly affirmed; actually, it is the “politicised” minority in the age
group, whose Taiwanese identity is most pronounced, that also shows the strongest will
to fight. It is thus not impossible that following a “low ebb,” the Taiwanese will to fight
could grow alongside the general spread of a gradually more widely shared and less
disputed Taiwanese identity. 
6 The  authors  continue  with  a  consideration  of  the  Taiwanese  business
community  based  in  China,  often  finding  themselves  in  paradoxical  situations  as
reflected in  their  contradictory statements,  but  with their  Taiwanese identity  well-
anchored though not always loudly proclaimed. The authors note in concluding the
first  part that Beijing’s  ability to create confidence-building measures and attitudes
while avoiding humiliating or provocative ones would play a big role in determining
the choices of an indeterminate generation. In this regard, I would add that mainland
China’s  Taiwan  policy  since  2008  has  displayed  greater  moderation than  earlier,
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judging by Beijing’s attitude during the 2009 World Games at Kaohsiung and the Taipei
Deaflympics as well as the 2010 Taipei International Flora Expo.
7 The second section of the book, dealing with the external and international
consequences of Taiwan’s will  to fight, contains little that is new. It includes useful
indications of the security and defence policies being gradually developed by the new
KMT  government.  It  accurately  reflects  the  opinions  of  the  (pro-unification)  “dark
blue” camp, and compares them with subtlety and attention to detail with the more
centrist positions taken by Ma Ying-jeou, who has been able to shroud his real options
in mystery (pp. 193-197). The authors hold that notwithstanding the parliamentary and
political twists and turns, a certain trans-partisan “pragmatic” consensus is clearly re-
emerging as  regards  the minimal  conditions  for  Taiwan’s  defence.  They speak of  a
“minimum consensus” on the ROC’s sovereignty, on strengthening budget allocations
for  defence,  and  on  retaining  close  strategic  relations  with  the  United  States  (pp.
204-205). Finally, this complexity of the Taiwanese situation is matched by (as a direct
consequence  of  this  very  complexity)  a  more  varied  and  contrasted  evaluation  of
strategic  options  than  is  generally  expressed  either  in  Beijing  or  Washington  (pp.
207-230). While the political scenario has changed profoundly since 2008, the range of
possibilities for Taiwan remains far more open than is often supposed.
1. 1.  
Translated by N. Jayaram
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Tanguy Le Pesant, L’esprit de défense de Taiwan face à ...
China Perspectives, 2010/3 | 2010
3
